CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL DISCOURSE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN KADUNA STATE

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Abstract
There is a complex history of violent conflict and other related activities carried out by the Indigenes of Kaduna State which involve Fulani herdsmen and Community members in Southern Kaduna and some other part that has spanned decades. However, over the years, the Kaduna State government both military and civilian, neglected and/or failed to bring a solution to the conflict. Various commissions of inquiry, panels of investigation as well as committees of conflict resolution have been set up over the years to make policy, recommendations for ending the conflict Overcoming Conflict and challenges in the State. This is a gigantic task that may not only require massive injection of time and resources but also a clear vision and strategy for moving forward. Strategic Plans are being developed for the State in managing Conflict situation. But these will only be effective when fully embedded in key State and even National policy and budgeting processes, particularly at the local level, State and National investment plans. In the short-run, pursuance of peace and human rights within the region should be top priority while in the medium to long-term, focus must be on growth and development. This paper looked at the possible causes of Conflict in Kaduna State and some ways that would likely be employed in managing the Conflict as a factor for the State development.

Keywords: Conceptual, Theoretical Discourse, Conflict Management, Kaduna State

1 Introduction

In order to understand the meaning of "conflict management", it is important to explain how conflict can be viewed in the first place. According to Walter Laqueur, "conflict may be seen as terrorist act and the precise definition of terrorism does not exist nor will it be found in the foreseeable future (Laqueur 1977)."[3] This is probably because "one man's terrorism may be another man's patriotism (Han, 1993),."[4] However, the Federal Bureau for Investigation (FBI) views terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerceany segment of the population in furtherance of political or social objectives (Grisetand Mahan, 2003),."[5] Paul Pillar identifies four key elements of terrorism: It is premeditated, politically-driven and publicity-seeking, and it

[3] Laqueur W., (1977), *Terrorism*, London, New York Publishers. p.7.
[4]Han H.: (1993), Terrorism and Political Violence - Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control, New York Publishers, p.7.
[5]Griset P. and Mahan S.: (2003), *Terrorism in Perspective*, New York Publishers, p. xiii.

uses ideological or religious justification.[6] The study of conflict management in Nigeria particularly Kaduna State as the area of research have revealed that Pillar's elements of terrorism are prevalent in the State's conflict. The violence is premeditated, politically-driven and it uses political, ethical or religious ideology for its justification. Jocelyn Hollander observes that terrorists may refer to their violence as a form of resistance (Hollander, 2004).[7] Meanwhile, others see it as a struggle for liberation and social justice (Ramsey, 1993).[8] The term "conflict management" is linked to how the people in living community can tolerate one another and agree to avoid any act which will likely cause violence among them. People in the community use terror to fulfil either the political, ethnicity or religious obligation or to protect their way of life. Yet, historically, it must be taken into consideration that religious followers in Africa have always played an important role in conflict violence. The role they play show that their use of terror is pre-meditated, justified by religious ideology and sometimes politically motivated, depending on the place, time and socio-political context.

Poverty levels remain significantly high in Northern Nigeria despite the numerous targeted to reduce poverty in this region over the past decade. Even when income poverty is reported to have fallen elsewhere in the country between 1999 and 2013 when the newly elected political government came in and review the salary scheme, poverty levels have remained high in Northern Nigeria. Overwhelming evidence suggests that insecurity in the region over the last 15 years is the most important explanatory factor for the high poverty incidence as it has resulted in death and human displacement grossly undermining the productive sector and leading to poor service delivery. Conflict in Kaduna State has made certain groups within society vulnerable in a way that is not reflected in other parts of the State. Such groups include the numerous ethnic groups that are affected by conflict such as farmer's herdsmen conflict, religious violence and ethno-conflict violence.

The resources that are explored in the country and the income generated by the States, should have been used to tackle the issue of insecurity. Despite the funds that are channeled to tackle insecurity in both the federal and the State level, violence increases in geometrical figure. In Kaduna State for example, a number of conflict violence for a decade be it religious, political or ethno-conflict has destroyed farm lands, properties and even the development and unity of the people living within the state(Uchenna, 2011).[9]
Between 1990 and 2018 to date, Nigeria suffered numerous ethno-religious conflicts with considerable loss of life and property. In pursuit of these goals, the federal and state governments among other institutions, establish a commission of inquiry to address the wrongs which had been perpetrated. The role of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights was to inquire into "the causes and circumstances" surrounding mass murders, arbitrary arrests, the role of law enforcement agents and the state security agencies, and discrimination which occurred. It was also meant to suggest

[6] P.: (2014), What is Terrorism? CIA's Counterterrorist Center, 2014: http://mrfarshtey.net/whnotes/Terrorism.pdf, accessed 2 October, 2019.
[7] Hollander J. : (2004). *Conceptualizing Resistance*, in: Sociological Forum. 19(4), p. 533-554.
[8] Ramsey J.: (1993), Terrorism - The Trinity Perspective, in: Terrorism and Political Violence - *Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control,* New York, p. 13.

[9] Uchenna, E. (2011) *''Crises and Conflict in Nigeria,* '' International Development LawOrganization, Viale Vaticano, p 15

ways of preventing such abuses from recurring. The Commission was also expected to determine the role of various state institutions in both perpetrating and hiding gross human rights violations as a process of conflict management. The government role is to ensure that peace is maintain and the recommendations given to it is considered but neglected without implementing any but only promised that the results and findings of this Commission would be treated seriously (Uchenna, 2011).[10] While it is plausible that insecurity may be the most important factor explaining the high poverty levels in the region, it is critical that we do not lose sight of other broader social, political, economic and policy process that may account for the regional development. The time is also right for looking beyond the ravages of violence and war to a phase of rehabilitation and reconstruction of affected areas and people in Kaduna State.

To inform key policy decisions on post-conflict reconstruction in Kaduna State, this chapter presents a balanced discussions of conflict management and factors that causes conflict in Kaduna State. The post conflict scenario that compares outcomes in this State to elsewhere in the country. Attempts are made to explore in-depth the following.

2. Literature Review

This study will attempt to review the earlier works on the subject of the research made by some other writers in relation to the subject of the study with a view to identify the relevance and gaps.

Onuoha (2012),[11] in his paper, ‘’The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, analysis and emerging trend’’ emphasized that, the situation is not that simple. Like transitional justice, the state is often in dilemma of choosing between the prosecution of perpetrators of violence and the exacerbation, or even perpetuation of the violence. He opines that, this is because culpability in such circumstances transcends the visible foot-soldiers overtly engage in the mayhem. He further explained, in most cases, the logistics and strategic planning this violence are provided by high profile individuals and groups, who may be state functionaries in the public service, the armed forces, the intelligentsia or the business community. A decision to prosecute such individuals may, therefore, end up reinforcing the entire conflict; hence no white paper on violence has ever been acted upon by government. He wrote that retaliation violence only breeds further violence. The counter-violence that has trailed the repressive state responses to the current Jos and Maiduguri disturbances justifies this assertion.

However, the writer’s belief is that this state of affairs, therefore, requires a long term comprehensive strategy that will address the causes of religious violence and evolve a consensual approach to its implementation. It is admitted that some of the causes of violence identified above, have been entrenched in the Country’s Constitutional, Statutory and Policy instruments, and therefore, attempts at reversing them would be difficult and need extreme caution. Still a closer engagement by the leaders of the two religious and the government may forge some compromise. This research will discuss some of the modern strategies that if properly adopted will bring solution to conflict violence in Nigeria.

[10] Ibid

[11] Onuoha, Freedom C., (2012). The Audacity of Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend. *Security Journal,* 25, p. 134-151

Uzodike (2008)[12]in his paper ''Conflict resolution through regional organizations in Africa'' emphasize on the role of women in peace making. The negative impact of armed conflict and poverty on women is particularly unacceptable because not only women are disproportionate victims, they are in most cases excluded from peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction in their communities. The writer lamented that, Africa arguably presents a major challenge and fertile ground for conflict and peace studies because it has been more plagued by violent intra and inter-state conflict of various kinds since the 1960s than any other continent.

According to the writers view, the involvement of women in peace process making has played a vital role in some countries. In Rwanda for example, women participation in peace making help the government of Rwanda to maintain peace and order because of the respect given to women. One of his opinion is that, in Nigeria for example, most of the conflict cannot be easily overcome because women are not involve and where they are allowed to be involved, they are playing an active role particularly in the negotiation. While a multiplicity of factors is responsible for these conflicts, they all reflect the failure of national political systems to prevent them ab initio, effectively manage their symptoms or mediate them when they occur. It is pertinent to note that the vast majority of world leaders, of governments and officials at all levels, and of the presidents and boardrooms of transnational corporations are men. Women have a key role to play in conflict settlement and have been practice by some African countries such as Rwanda and Uganda in a commission they called Gacaca Court and worked perfectly. This court involves women in a communal conflict whose role contributed immensely to settle the warring parties. This research will also suggest that the women should be involved in most of the committees of inquiry setup to investigate some conflict violence in Nigeria. There has never a period when Kaduna State engages women in any of the Commission of Inquiry in the State. This clearly creates a gap by the government which attention should have been giving in order to facilitate a smooth negotiation process.

Kwaja (2009)[13]in his article entitled ''Strategies for Rebuilding State Capacity to Manage Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Nigeria'' Identifies fragility of the institutions of the state in terms of their ability and capacity to manage diversity, corruption, rising inequality between the rich and the poor, gross violation of human rights, environmental degradation, conflict over land, among others as the underlying causes of violent conflict in Nigeria since the inception of democratic rule in 1999. He believes that the failure of government is as a result of recurring sectarian violence in Nigeria. As seen and known, the foremost incidence of religious violence since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 was triggered by an alleged violation of a religious rite. Although lack of adequate statistical data has made it extremely difficult to estimate the exact number of religious conflicts in Nigeria and their resultants fatalities, the general assumption is that the incidence of religious violence has grown exponentially since the return to democratic rule in 1999.
However, the writer had identified few causes compared to what other causes are, like domestic violence, discrimination, marginalization/domination and above all

[12]Patel, U. (2008): *Conflict Resolution Through Regional Organizations in Africa*. In: Maloka, (Eds). AUnited State of Africa? Pretoria, AISA (African Institute of South Africa) p. 101
[13]Kwaja, Chris M.A. (2009), Strategies for Rebuilding State Capacity to Manage Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Nigeria: Religious Violence in Nigeria,*The journal of pan African Studies*, pp. 105

religious/intra-religious difference which is the foundation of every conflict in Nigeria since Independence. The emergence of Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) in Nigeria as far back as 70s was as a result of Muslim Student Society (MSS) whose objective is to promote the spread of Islamic religion within the Tertiary Institutions and secondary schools in Nigeria. The leaders of MSS whose majority are not vast in Islamic teaching and knowledge, started receiving journal on Islamic publication mostly from Pakistan, India and Egypt. Most of this publication carries a message on revolution and disobeying the government. Later they move their loyalty to Iran who sent Books and publications regarding Islam and Islamic government with the intention to spread Islam within the globe. Within a short period of time, they change their perception and their thinking on good Islamic governance and teaching to that of Iranian who send them the messages. As a result of these, they resist any government that came on power for the reason that it is not an Islamic government and they would not be loyal and allegiance to it. This was the first emergence of the Islamic movement in the Tertiary Institutions in Nigeria and the beginning of the conflict in the Nigerian Institutions which the writer did not capture. There was no report available to the writer as to whether government had established a Commission of Inquiry in relation to this issue but this research will enlighten in finding solutions to conflicts generally.

Omotosho (2003)[14]in his article entitled ''Religious Violence in Nigeria-the Causes and Solution: an Islamic Perspective'' opined that the wrong perception of other people's religion or faith, wrong religious orientation, the low level of religious literacy on religious adherents, selfishness on the part of religious personalities, pervasive poverty, government involvement in religious matters, among others are responsible for religious conflict in Nigeria. He added that, he recognizes disparaging publications by both Muslims and Christian's elites as the major causes of religious conflict in the country.
The writer at this point may be right but forgot to realize that, the content of religious scriptures as they are having no any contradiction in terms of passing the message particularly in relation to unity and love. The major religions (Islam and Christianity) in Nigeria teach what is good e.g. peace, love, honesty and prohibits the evil like cheating, adultery, stealing, murder and other Criminal offences. The writer failed to justify religion as a basis of conflict in Nigeria but rather mention some elements as the reasons for conflict. The constitution of Nigeria 1999[15] provides for freedom of religion, that a person is free to exercise any religion of his own choice. In the ordinary usage, religion is the only means of unity and uniting people not a means of division. This research will narrate some religious provision specifically design to regulate on just war and how religion can be used in bringing peace to violent situation.

Nathaniel (1996),[16] in his paper entitled ''Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence'' he wrote the challenge of religious intolerance and fundamentalism may not necessarily entail violence; however, it is the extreme manifestation of intolerance and fundamentalist ideals that embraces violence. He added that, religious extremists are therefore religious fundamentalists, who take religious conservatism and intolerance to an

[14]Omotosho, A.O.(2003). Religious Violence in Nigeria-the Causes and Solution: An Islamic Perspective. *Swedish Missiological Theme*, pp.135
[15] Section. 38, Chapter IV of FRN 1999 Constitution.
[16]Nathaniel D. (1996), Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: the' Maitatsine 'and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria. Peace and Conflicts Studies Programme, *Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan*.. Available from http://www.ifra-nigeria.org (accessed 23rd june 2017).

unreasonable extent, by manifesting violence against those who has contrary religious views. He also argued that, religious extremists take the position that if others do not follow their ways, they will be damned. They abhor the preaching of other faiths and resort to violence to stop it. He went further to explain that, the followers insist that their religious doctrine must be universally entrenched by brute force, while the political, social and economic systems must conform to their religious tenets. What the writer failed to understand is that, religious extremism does not admit of any compromise with social change, particularly that which contradicts religious orthodoxy but Islam recognizes changes and modalities especially which is not against the tenet of religion. In terms of priority, therefore, religious extremism can only mean sticking to the rule and provision of a religion.

The writer in this situation seems not clear about the meaning of religious extremism and religious fundamentalism. The context within which he interprets religious extremism and fundamentalism is different from the teaching of the major religions practice in Nigeria (Islam and Christianity). In the context of religion, extremism and fundamentalism simply means complete or total submission to the teaching of the scriptures i.e. divine revelation. On the other hand, religious extremism and fundamentalism may also mean high belief and reliance to the religious tenets without compromise to any conventional tenets and principles. The writer did not justify the religious extremism and fundamentalism as a cause of conflict and violence in Nigeria but rather all the religion teaches peace and unity.

3. Methodology

The research methodology adopted in this study is mostly doctrinal. Both primary and secondary sources shall be the basis of this research work. The primary sources shall include the Conflict that affects Kaduna State over the years. Reports of some Conflicts in some part of Nigeria. While the secondary sources shall also be collected from research reports, from Newspapers and other journal of academic learning, seminar papers, the internet, thesaurus, encyclopaedia and other published, unpublished and internet materials.

3.1 Definition of Conflict

Conflict is a universal feature of human society. It takes its origins in economic differentiation, social change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organization – all of which are inherently conflictual and become overt through the formation conflict of parties, which comes to have, or are perceived to have, mutually incompatible goals. The identity of the conflict parties, the levels at which the conflict is contested, and the issues fought over (scarce resources, unequal relations, competing values) may vary over time and may themselves be disputed. Conflicts are dynamic as they escalate and de- escalate, and are constituted by a complex interplay of attitudes and behaviors that can assume a reality of their own. Third parties are likely to be involved as the conflict develops, and may themselves thereby become parties in an extended conflict. An important point to note from the outset is how early theorists in the field distinguished between destructive and constructiveconflict, suggesting that the former was to be avoided but the latter was a necessary and valuable aspect of human creativity. This

remains key for understanding the normative orientation of the conflict resolution field as a whole(Morton &Peter 2009).[17]
Conflicts have been variously defined in relation to 'fights, games and debates, conflict is defined as a form of competition between a perceived or actual incompatible needs, goals, desires, ideas, or resources. Conflict is an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals(Burton, 1962).[18] Another working definition by some scholars, conflict is a process in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party, it can also be seeing as a struggle or contest between people with opposing needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals. Conflict can also be defined as a process that begins when one party perceives that another party has negatively affected or is about to affect something that the first party cares about. It can also be a process by which the effort of ''A'' are purposefully made to upset the effort of ''B'' in attaining his /her goals(Wilmot, 2003).[19] This remains controversial. for example, some have used 'conflict' to refer both to 'consensual' conflicts over interests (disputants want the same thing) and to 'dissension' conflicts over values (disputants do not want the same thing)[20]; others, however, have called the former 'disputes' that require settlement and have reserved the term 'conflict' for deeper struggles over unsatisfied human needs that require resolution(Aubert, 1935).

Burton, expressed that conflict can be described as a situation of true or perceived disagreement through which the parties involved identify a threat to their interests, values/ethnics or concerns, conflict is natural, inevitable and potentially constructive. He further explains and use the term 'conflict' to refer to the widest set of circumstances in which conflict parties perceive that they have a mutual and incompatible goals – although there is a difference between conflicts depending on the reasons and ground that causes it(Burton, 1962).[21]

But this research aimed at addressing the current debate within the field between conflict resolution and conflict transformation although the research will then set this aside as well. In this research, it perceived conflict transformation as the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition, rather than as a separate venture, as some would prefer,[22] for example, downgrades conflict resolution in comparison with conflict transformation on the grounds that it is content- centered rather than relationship- centered, aims at immediate agreement rather than long- term process, and is committed only to de-escalation rather than also including escalation to pursue constructive change(Rusett, 2011);. This is something of a caricature of the field, and is reminiscent of the way in which in an earlier period Burton caricatured 'dispute settlement' in comparison with the deeper process of 'conflict resolution', which he defined in much the same way as Lederach and others now define conflict transformation.

[17] Morton, D. and Peter, W. (2009). ''*Understand Conflict Resolution:* The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution. Butterworth, P 49
[18] Burton, J.W. (1962)..*: Peace Theory. Precondition of Disarmament*. New York P. 201
[19] Wilmot, H. (2003) : *A Complementarity of the Conflict*. New York P. 87
[20] Aubert, A.; (1935), ''*Pacifism is not Enough. Problems of Peace''* Butterworth Publishers, Ninth series, p 128.
[21]Burton, J.W. (1962)..*: Peace Theory. Precondition of Disarmament*. New York P. 201
[22] Rusett, A. (2011); Strengthening the Frame Work of Peace. A Study of Currents Proposals for Amending Developing or Replacing Present International *Institutes for the Maintenance of Peace*: London. P. 150 -- 225.

In view of the researcher, it does not matter in the end which label is used as the umbrella term so long as the field itself is coherent enough to contain the substance of what is being advocated in each case. The researcher believe that the field does retain its coherence which it is best left intact, and that conflict resolvers and conflict transformers are essentially engaged in the same enterprise. The word conflict resolution is use as the generic term for four reasons. First, because it was the earliest term used to define the new field (Tolanda, 1993).[23] Second, because it is still the most widely used term among analysts and practitioners – recent examples are Deutsch and Coleman's edited volume (Bercovitch, et al. 2000),.[24] Third, because conflict resolution' is the term that is most familiar in the media and among the general public. Fourth because the term 'conflict transformation' is in itself inherently indeterminate unless further qualified transformation in which direction? As explained in the preface, conflict resolution has from the start encompassed 'conflict settlement' at one end of the spectrum and 'conflict transformation' at the other. As is made explicit historically there have always been tensions between the two (Bercovitch, et al. 2000).[25]

3.2 Factors that Cause Conflict in Nigeria.

Several causes of conflict violence in Nigeria have been identified. Whereas most of these causes conflate, emphasis on the underlying socio-political, economic and governance factors that gestate not only religious conflicts, but violent conflicts in Nigeria generally. In this research however, the focus is on the immediate and visible factors that generate conflict violence rather than the remote precipitating and other social factors that animate it.

Notwithstanding this religious geography, Nigeria is not wholly divided along ethnic and religious lines. There are communities in the north that are predominantly Christian. There are communities in some parts of the southeast that converted to Islam. Today there are Muslim migrants from northern Nigeria to many southern cities as there are Christian communities of southern migrants or descendants of migrants in almost all northern cities(Nathaniel, 1996),[26]

During Nigeria's colonial and post-colonial history, governments regulated differences between these religious constituencies. The system of indirect rule introduced by the British retained the established administrative structure and custodial power and position of Islam in the north. The emirs were not divested of their power and influence. Sharia courts, for example, were integrated within the general colonial justice system of administration. This system of indirect rule was soon introduced and applied in southern Nigeria. The system of customary or indigenous laws and courts were also integrated with the system of British-established courts(Abimboye, 2009).[27]

With independence and the division of the new country into three ethno political regions, Islam and Christianity became associated with ethnic groups. The post-independence

[23]Tolanda, J.D.(1993). *Ethnicity and the State*. Political and Legal Anthropology Series No. 9. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. P.7

[24]Bercovitch, R., Victor K., and William Z.(2000), *TheHandbook of Conflict Resolution,* Butterworth Publishers, P.38.

[25] Ibid.

[26]Nathaniel D. (1996), Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: the' Maitatsine 'and 'Boko Haram' crises in Northern Nigeria. Peace and conflicts studies programme, *Institute of African studies, University of Ibadan*. Available from http://www.ifra-nigeria.org (accessed 23rd june 2017).

[27] Abimboye, D. (2009) "The Damage Religious Crises Have Done to the North," News watch, November, 2,

engagement of Nigerian Muslims and Christians along regional and ethnic distinctions also affected the notion of identity for a vast majority of Nigerians. Recent research reveals the extent to which identity and national integration are influential in Nigeria. The average northerner is more inclined toward identifying himself with Islamic religious affiliation while an average southerner tends to identify more with ethnicity and Christianity few with Islam. Thus, the politicization of ethno-religious issues in the post-independence Nigeria gave rise to conflicts over citizenship rights(Akinyele, 2005).[28]

Although the exact number of Muslims, Christians and those who practice African traditional religions is unknown, post-independent Nigeria reflected cultural, religious and political differences between Nigeria's dominant ethnicities, the Hausa ("Northerners"), Igbo ("Easterners") and Yoruba ("Westerners"). In fact, post independent Nigeria's government was a coalition of conservative parties: the Northern People Congress (NPC) primarily Northern and the majority are Hausa/Fulani, Igbo- and other minority tribes dominated National Congress for Nigerian Citizen (NCNC), led by Nigeria's first Governor-General Nnamdi Azikiwe. Obafemi Awolowo led the relatively liberal Action Group (AG) party, largely dominated by the Yoruba m(Ezejiofor, 1964.).[29]

Since its independence, Nigeria has remained a multi-ethnic nation state, grappling with the problems of ethnicity and ethno-religious conflict. The rise of ethnic militias, including the O' Dua People's Congress (OPC), the Bakassi Boys, the Egbesu Boys, the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), and the Igbo People Congress (IPC), the Arewa People's Congress (APC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Ohanaeze Ndigbo signaled greater divisions between ethnic groups(Ibrahim, 2002).[30] As a result, religious intolerance has become more violent and bloody with more devastating results usually with ethnic militias as executors. Consequently, contextual discrimination between ethnic or religious groups based on socio-cultural symbols and religion has heightened suspicion and fear, which have scarred Nigeria through recurrent ethno-religious conflict.[31] This diversity has spread all across the States in Nigeria as a factor that causes conflict[1](Ibrahim, 2002).

Constant feelings of distrust and fear of one ethnic or religious group dominating another follow a pattern of ethnic suspicion and intrigue discernible prior to independence, the military coup in 1966, the civil war and the continuous ethno-religious conflict that threaten the country's renascent democracy and its very existence. Often, accusations and allegations of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry underlie ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria.
In most nations, including Nigeria, different groups or individuals have conflicting interests and do not agree on how wealth, power and status are to be shared. Some resolve these social issues without conflict while some do not. Conflict usually occurs when deprived groups or individuals attempt to increase their share of power and wealth or to modify dominant values, norms, beliefs or ideology. A divisive interplay of politics, ethnicity and religion in Nigeria has led to rising nationalism and militancy of various

[28] Akinyele, R. T. (2005).*Contemporary Issues on Boundaries and Governance in Nigeria.* Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, P.103
[29] Ezejiofor, G. (1964.)*Protection of Human Rights under the Law.* London: Butterworth's, P. 84
[30] O. "Tackling the Challenges of Nationhood,"Daily Independent, Thurday,October 21, 2010.
[31] Ibrahim, J. (2002). Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democracy in Nigeria: Challenges. *Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor,*P.92

ethnic and religious movements. To Nigeria's detriment, ethno-religious conflict is seen as a means of correcting any perceived form of marginalization, oppression or domination. (Alemika, 2001).[32]

The absence of good governance over the years and concrete efforts to forge national integration and economic growth has also increased poverty and unemployment, resulting in the communal, ethnic, and religious and class conflict that have now characterized Kaduna State. The State condition of poor and jobless are exploited as mercenary fighters, ready to kill or be killed for a token benefit. As a result, ethno-religious crises usually have large turnouts, including under-aged fighters. The frailty of Nigeria's school system and failures of religious institutions in their expected roles coupled with other social problems have laid the foundation for conflicts in general (Egwu, 1998).[33] The specific factors that causes conflict are hereunder explain.

3.3 Socio-Economic Factor as a Cause of Conflict in Kaduna State

One significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment and support for Conflict Violence in Kaduna State is economic deprivation and religion. Abject poverty and economic dislocation of livelihoods have drastically reduced the options of many youths of Kaduna State and northern region. As highlighted above, deducing from the structural violence paradigm, individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization, can be used as mobilizing instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence(Briscoe et al., 2013),.[34] In southern Kaduna for example, the youth had contact with herdsmen for the reason that the Fulani entered their farms and destroy their crops, the Fulani denied and consequently, the violence between the two started which cost the life of many.

In May 2013, the Nigerian government released dozens of women and teenagers previously detained as relatives of suspected Boko Haram members. Among the youths were individuals who confessed to previously accepting payments of 5,000 Nigerian Naira from Boko Haram militants, who in turn provided them with kegs of fuel to set schools ablaze in Maiduguri, Borno State.[35] This is indicative of the economic desperation expressed by thousands of youths who have been rendered vulnerable by the shortcomings of Nigeria's leadership over several decades. According to Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the measure of relative poverty[36] is most apparent in the northern region. In comparison with the southeast and southwest zones, which have

[32]Alemika, E.E.O. (2001). "Ethnic Minorities in Nigeria: Constitutional Democratic Framework for Autonomy and Local Self-Governance" in Bagudu, N. and Dakas, D.C.J. (ed) *The Right to be Different: Perpectives on Minority Rights, theCultural Middle-Belt & Constitutionalism in Nigeria.* Jos: League for Human Rights, P.34

[33] Egwu, S. .(1998)"The Political Economy of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Nigeria" in Okoye, F. (ed) *Ethnicity and Religious Rights in Nigeria 2000.* Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor, P.47

[34]Briscoe, I., and Van Ginkel, B.(2013), "The Nexus between Development and Security"*League for Human Rights*, p. 5.

[35] N5,000 is equivalent to approximately 25 Euro. See Ibrahim Y. and Matazu, H. "Boko Haram Pardon: 23 Women, 35 Kids Freed", *Weekly Trus*t (1 June 2013), http://weeklytrust.com.ng/index.php/top-stories/12796-boko-haram-pardon-23-women-35-kids-freed. Retrieved on 5th may, 2018.

[36] Relative poverty is defined by reference to the living standards of majority in a given society.

relative poverty rates of 67.0% and 59.1% respectively, the north-east and north-west zones have higher figures of 76.3% and 77.7% of relative poverty (NBS, 2012).[37]

The phenomenon of the "youth bulge" in Africa and particularly in Nigeria has further increased the steady supply of economically-deprived individuals who have become susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram.[38] In regard to other vital indicators such as the education of girls, there are similar patterns of inequality with the northern region having much lower enrolment rates in comparison with the south. However, it is important to point out that the contrast in overall deprivation levels between the north and south is also a consequence of bad governance by successive northern leaders in their constituencies. With almost 200 million people aged between 15years and 24years, Africa has one of the youngest population groups in the world and it is growing rapidly (AU, 2012).[39] While Nigeria is firmly within the category of a very young age structure, with nearly three-quarter of its population under the age of 30years,[40] political violence inspired by marginalized youths in the country are stark reminders of the negative impact exceedingly large and mismanaged youth populations can exert across the world(Leahy, 2011),. Although many scholars are justified in pointing out that the connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect and complicated,[41] the huge number of young people living on the margins of Nigerian society intensifies these linkages (Krueger & Malečková, 2003).

Salkida, who had close contact with Mohammed Yusuf, held the belief that followers of Boko Haram were numbering up to hundreds of thousands, most of them *Almajiris*, school dropouts, renegade civil servants and parliamentary staff.[42] While the lack of reliable data and the difficulty of discerning between passive and active support for the group still poses a challenge, as of May 2013 up to the period of this research 2018, Boko Haram youths were reported to still abound in areas such as Sambisa Games Reserves Forest in Borno State.[43] Although socio-economic deprivation is clearly a powerful variable in the crisis equation in Nigeria, caution must be exercised in the way its predictive value is underscored. This is because there are other intervening variables which must be examined. Therefore, in considering the theoretical relevance of structural violence in a crisis that has a sectarian angle, reducing the Boko Haram crisis to causes such as economic inequality and social marginalization can obscure analysis of the role which other factors play the most predominant among them being religion.

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[37]National Bureau of Statistics, "*Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report"* (2012), p.16, http://www.proshareng.com/news/16302.html Retrieved,5th September, 2018.
[37]Ibid.
[38]Ibid
[39] African Union, "Harnessing the Demographic Dividend for Africa's Socio-Economic Development", *State of the African Population Report* (2012), p. 33
[40]Leahy, E., (2011), "The Shape of Things To Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World",*Population Action International*(2007, updated 2011), p. 26
[41]Krueger, A. and Malečková, J. (2003), "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection*?", Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 pp. 119-144
[42]Hansen, W., and Musa, U. (2013), "*Fanon, the Wretched and Boko Haram*p. 9. Ahmed Salkida is one of the few Nigerian journalists who interviewed the late Mohammed Yusuf. Claiming threats against his life and family, Salkida reportedly left Nigeria in 2013 for the United Arab Emirates
[43] A serving Senator from Borno State shed light on this during an interview which was posted online on YouTube on 12 May 2013: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKdRi_MKFnc. Retrieved on 10th may, 2018

3.4 Religious Factor as a Cause of Conflict in Kaduna State

The factor of religion is examined here because of the central role it plays as a defining feature and fault line of the Nigerian state. In Nigeria, the two dominant religions of Christianity and Islam have considerable reverence for the respective spiritual headship provided by their leaders, and this has been a major issue underlining sectarian consciousness, tensions and radicalization.[44] More significantly, nearly every decade of Nigeria's contemporary history is replete with violence and conflicts that have religious undertones. Prior to Nigeria's civil war, many of the southern Igbos lost their lives in 1966. In 1980, hundreds died as a result of several weeks of rioting sparked by a confrontation between the Maitatsine group and the Nigerian Police at a rally in Kano State. In 1991, over 200, mostly southern Christians, lost their lives while over 20 churches were burnt by Muslims reacting to news of a planned visit by German Christian evangelist Reinhard Bonnke to Nigeria (Achtar, 2010),.[45] The 2000s ushered Nigerians into the bloodiest decade in which thousands have died as a result of Christian-Muslim clashes in Abia and Ile-Ife where Muslims were butchered. The dead bodies of those who lost their lives were transported to Kano given to their families for proper burial, this raised tensions in Kano State and spread all across the northern States. Religion in some cases thus appears to be the language of politics exploited by both state and non-state actors towards ends that are essentially parochial (Sako, 1998).[46]

However, Kaduna State has experienced various forms of conflict, the State has become the threshold for violent and massive killings perpetrated especially in the years 1987, 1992, 2000 and 2011. In 1987, violence erupted in the College of Education Kafanchan where Christians claimed to be attacked by Muslims over an alleged misrepresentation and interpretation of the Quran. The violence soon extended to Zaria, Kaduna, Katsina, Ikara and other places. Hundreds of lives were killed; Mosque and Churches were burnt and property worth millions destroyed. In 1992, Zangon Kataf was twice engulfed in violent clashes where indigenous Christians of Atyap community claimed to be attacked by Muslims residents over the relocation and opening of the market on the outskirts of the town in May of 1992 (Abdulbarkando, et al., 2018),.[47] The Muslims on the other hand claimed to be slaughtered by the Christian community in Bajju where more than one thousand people were killed, in Zonkwa Two Hundred and Sixty Eight people were killed and Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU) who are the voice of the community in defending the Southern Kaduna community did not raised a finger because Muslims were killed[48]

However, beyond these, religion by itself is not the major problem or cause of the crisis in Kaduna State and Nigeria as a whole. Rather, the destructive exploitation of the religious temperament by followers has been contrived into a key driver of public support for violence in the country. It is the manipulation of religion that has been capitalized on by

[44] Op cit at p.11
[45]Achtar, A., (2010), "Challenging Al-Qa'ida's Justification of Terror", in Fisher D. and Wicker B. eds., *Just War on Terror: A Christian and Muslim Response:*Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 32.
[46]Sako, R.(1998) "The Crises of Ethnicity in Kaduna State" in Okoye, F. (ed) *Ethnicity and Religious Rights in Nigeria.* Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor, P.48
[47]Abdulbarkando A., and Alupsen B., (2018), Southern Kaduna and Atrocities of Hausa-Fulani Muslim Herdsmen, *Open Doors International, World Watch Research* Vol. 1
[48]A discussion with Prof. Sanusi Mekudi (Dan'iyan Jama'a) a community leader Southern Kaduna Muslims by Sunrise Daily Television, on a topic ''Finding Peace in Southern Kaduna'' on 15th June, 2017.

the religious followers to the detriment of the Nigerian state while misrepresenting either the Islam or Christian faith and community. This point is crucial for an understanding of how the cause of conflict is not based on the mere presence of the factor of religion. Rather, conflict erupts when this factor, individually or collectively with other factors, is manipulated in favour (or disfavour) of certain interests. This assertion about the role of religion is also acknowledged by Seul, who explains that "religion is not the cause of 'religious conflict'(Seul, 1999),.[49] Seul notes that when conflicts involving one or more religious groups occur, the combatants may be emboldened by a sense of religiously-defined identity and purpose, and their traditions may provide a fund of symbolic, moral and institutional basis that can be used to mobilize the group and legitimize its cause.[50] This occurred in the Nigerian case: while religion is essentially a force for good, religious followers employs it as a machination to express high levels of negativity. It has thus been stage-managed by the group as an instrument for stereotyping and demonizing opponents, such that exhortations to violence in the area affected by conflict have acquired great potency once framed in religious terms.[51]

The escalation of violence and its impact on the northern region appears to have diminished the influence which the call for a (Boko Haram-styled) Sharia imposition previously conveyed. Similar to the actions of al Qaeda, the violence perpetrated by followers is not religiously inspired; rather they purport to be religiously justified by manipulating Islamic law and its sources in order to legitimize themselves in the eyes of Muslims. Indeed, within mainstream Sunni legal writings on the conduct of war, it is forbidden to intentionally kill individuals classified under the category of non-combatants.[52] Consequently, a number of leaders in the Nigerian Muslim community and Christian alike have spoken against Brutal killings and taking the lives of the innocent ones in the name of religioun. Some of these individuals include, late Sheikh Abba Aji, Sheikh Ahmad Gumi, Sheikh Dahiru Usman Bauchi, Rev. Martin Kuka, Rev. Orisieje Okafor and many others. The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Sa'ad Abubakar III – the spiritual head of Muslims in Nigeria – has further denounced the terrorist action groups by calling them evil.[53]

3.5 Socio-political Factor as a Cause of Conflict in Nigeria Generally

There is an intricate link in Nigeria between politics, governance, corruption, poverty and violence. Politics is largely driven by money. Elected officials are hardly accountable to citizens.[54] The well-connected exercise undue influence according to the strength of their purse and the strings they can pull. The various elite factions – political, economic/business, bureaucratic, traditional and religious – have been drawn into a

[49] Seul, J. (1999), ''Ours is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict",*Journal of Peace Research*36, no. 5 pp. 553-569.
[50] Opcit.
[51] International Crisis Group, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict" (2010).
[52]The International Crisis Group, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict" (2010).
[53]Achtar,A.,(2010), "Challenging Al-Qa'ida's Justification of Terror", in Fisher, D. and Wicker, B.eds., *Just War on Terror: A Christian and Muslim Response,* Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 32.
[54] Nigerian politicians are among the worlds best paid. "Nigeria boils over", *The New York Times*, 12 January 2012. A legislator earns about $189,000 per year. "Nigerian lawmakers top salaries chart", *Daily Trust* (Abuja), 22 July 2013; "Rewarding work", *The Economist*, 15 July 2013. Elected officials have full immunity while in office. "Immunity for president, governors hampers anti-graft war – EFCC [Economic and Financial Crimes Commission]", *Vanguard* (Lagos), 4 October 2011.

political economy driven by huge oil receipts and implicated in wide-scale and systemic corruption.

Nigeria is consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries.[55] This has denied millions opportunities. According to former World Bank Vice President for Africa Ezekwesili, Nigeria has lost more than $400 billion to large-scale corruption since independence in 1960.[56] When corruption and clientelism do not work, politicians often revert to violence to achieve their aims. "Godfathers" use thugs and militias to intimidate opponents and in the vicious, sometimes deadly struggles for local power or against other ethnic or sectarian groups.[57]

The financial recklessness and extravagance of many former (and serving) governors is well documented. Debts have soared, and many states face bankruptcy.[58] Some of the money used for corruption, patronage and political violence by governors comes from "security votes", joint state/local government accounts and money laundering.[59] The "security vote" is "a budget line that is meant to act as a source of discretionary spending that the executive can use to respond quickly and effectively to threats to peace and security". It is the most abused budget item, because there is no oversight.[60]

Poverty is a product of bad governance, including a bloated administration. A bulging percentage of federal and state budgets is allocated to salaries, allowances, pocket money, foreign trips and temporary duty tours constraining capital and development projects. The federal government has been borrowing for recurrent consumption, not to invest in development. For many the name of the game has been spending, Importing and looting.[61]

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[55] In 2013, Nigeria ranked 144th of 177. "Corruption by Country/Territory: Nigeria", Nigeria Transparency International (www.transparency.org), 2013. Retrieved 17th May, 2018.

[56] "Nigeria loses $400bn to oil thieves – Ezekwesili", *Vanguard*, 28 August 2012. Retrieved on 17th may, 2018.

[57] Crisis Group Report, *Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment*; Briefing N°79, *Nigeria's Elections: Reversing the Degeneration?*, 24 February 2011, pp. 5-6; "Criminal Politics: Violence, 'Godfathers' and Corruption in Nigeria", Human Rights Watch, October (2007), p. 32.

[58] "Total Public Debt Stock as at 30th September, 2013", Debt Management Office of Nigeria (online), 30 September 2013. "The CIA World Facebook" (online), 13 January 2014. Total debt is more than the annual federal budget. "Understanding the 2013 Budget", Budget Office of the Federation (online). Federal and state governments tend to borrow to finance budget gaps rather than development projects. "States face bankruptcy over N339.9bn foreign debt – RMAFC", *Punch*, 15 March (2012). Retrieved on 15th April, 2018.

[59] "Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria", Human Rights Watch, January (2007), pp. 3-18.

[60] "Criminal Politics", The Crisis Group interviews, Abuja, July 2013. The ambiguity and secrecy associated with national security has enabled misappropriation since President Ibrahim Babangida's rule (1985-1993).

[61] "Nigeria: before country goes bankrupt", *This Day*, 16 October 2011. Most is spent on three million office holders (about 2 per cent of the population), their families, dependents and "electoral constituencies". "75 per cent of Nigeria's resources spent on governance", *Nigerian Tribune*, 7 October 2011; "Overhead takes 72 per cent as government budgets N4.75 trillion for 2012", *TheGuardian*, 17 November 2011. Olusegun Agagun, former finance minister and now trade and investment minister, revealed during his senate confirmation hearing in July 2011 that recurrent expenditure was 74 per cent of the 2011 federal budget. The finance minister and coordinating minister for the economy, Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, gave a 54.1 per cent figure. "Budget not good for development – Okonjo-Iweala", *Punch*, 7 July 2012. 76 per cent of the 2014 budget was allocated to recurrent expenditures. Obbo Effanga, "Inside Nigeria's scandalous 2014 Budget – Investigation", *Premium Times*, 11 January 2014.

Prices but not salaries have risen.[62] Decaying infrastructure, chronic electricity shortages and an influx of cheaper imported products have led to massive factory closures and worsening unemployment.[63] Educated young people, including a growing number of university and polytechnic graduates, seek ever more elusive jobs.[64] Many youths in the north lack education, have few or no skills and are hardly employable.[65] Idle, they are easily recruited by anti-state and militia groups. Poverty has been increasing despite relatively strong economic growth; 112.5 million– over 70 per cent of the population are classified as poor and absolutely poor. Sokoto state in the North West has the highest poverty rate (86.4 per cent), Niger state in North Central the lowest.[66] The North East, Boko Haram's main operational field, has the worst poverty rate of the six geopolitical "zones".[67]

In January 2012, Nigerian President Good luck Jonathan noted that some sympathizers of Boko Haram were not only members of the executive, legislative and judicial arms of his government, but also the country's armed forces.[68] Although intelligence reports in 2013 appear to suggest that the group's support base is generally weak,[69] earlier periods are highly indicative of the passive, yet profound role that political entities may have played in bolstering the group. For instance, the expression of this tacit role by northern Nigerian elites is reflected in the complex political dynamics in Borno State. Before 2009, Boko

[62] Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, "A country's frustration fuelled overnight", *The New York Times*, 16 January 2012; "Fuel subsidy: public sector workers demand new wage", *The Sun*, 31 January 2012.

[63] "Our resource curse: Dutch or Nigerian disease?", *Premium Times* (Abuja), 28 April 2013. As of the end of 2013, Nigeria generated 3,563 megawatts of electricity, about 4 per cent of the 85,000 megawatts the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) estimates as the minimum requirement for industrial and commercial needs. "Electricity generation dropped by 954 mw in 2013", *Daily Trust*, 7 January 2o14; "Nigeria needs 85,000mw of electricity to meet demand, says NACCIMA", *The Guardian* (Lagos), 4 March 2014.

[64] "Jonathan laments lack of adequate skills among Nigerian graduates", *Vanguard*, 23 October 2013.

[65] The president of the Nigeria Entrepreneurs Forum, Dr. Sidney Inegbedion, said that according to the National Bureau of Statistics, unemployment had risen to 49 million, and that "52 per cent of these … were unemployable due to lack of skills". "Lack of Skills, Cause of High Unemployment", *This Day* (Lagos), 26 June 2012.

[66] A serving Senator of Borno State shed light on this during an interview which was posted online on YouTube on 12 May 2013: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WKdRi_MKFnc. Retrieved on 10th may, 2018.

59 The national economy, though still relatively strong, slowed from 7.4 per cent growth in 2011 to 6.6 per cent in 2012. "The oil sector continues to drive the economy, with average growth of about 8.0 per cent compared to -0.35 per cent for the non-oil sector. Agriculture and the oil and gas sectors continue to dominate economic activities …. The economic growth has not translated into job creation or poverty alleviation. Unemployment increased from 21 in 2010 to 24 per cent in 2011 because the sectors driving the economic growth are not high job-creating sectors …. The major policy issue is employment generation, particularly among the youth, and inclusive growth". "Nigeria Economic Outlook", Africa Development Bank Group, 2013. Nigeria's states are officially grouped into six zones based roughly on linguistic affinity, contiguity and cultural affiliation. These are the North West, North East, North Central, South West, South East and South, South. Crisis Group capitalizes specific zones, but not regions such as the north.

[68] Ogbu, A., "Jonathan: Boko Haram in Government, Threat Worse than Civil War", *This Day* (8 January 2012), http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/jonathan-boko-haram-in-govt-threat-worse-than-civil-war/106713/.

[69] Interview by Ogbua, A. with a Nigerian security official in May 2013. There have been a number of Boko Haram-inspired attacks in 2013. However, there is no evidence reflecting a significant increase in offensive capability. For instance, since the high profile attack on an international organization such as the United Nations office in Abuja in 2011, the group has not been able to stage a similarly sophisticated offensive on a global target.

Haram was believed to be under the influence of key politicians. There have been suspicions that certain political elites in Borno State funded the group and lifestyle of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Such individuals were further described as politicians who relied on the popular support which Yusuf could amass in favour of electoral victory during elections in 2003 and 2007. In fact, during this period, an influential affiliate of Yusuf's group was appointed as the Commissioner of Religious Affairs in Borno State. This man was known as Alhaji Buji Foi and before his death at the hands of security forces in July 2009, he was regarded as a major financier of Boko Haram.

While the late Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf was executed in a similar fashion around the same time, evidence of popular (and political) support for Yusuf was reflected in his position as a Borno State representative in Nigeria's Supreme Council of Sharia. Northern Nigerians who lent support to Boko Haram in the past are suspected to have done so partly because they believed in the group's radical ideology. However, more significantly, when this ideology resonates among individuals with access to power and resources, it clearly benefits the group's operational capacities (Bello, 2013).[70] Political actors who at one period or the other associated themselves with Boko Haram's leadership capitalized on the ability of the group to mobilize broad support from its members. This support was of course based on Yusuf's access to resources, which was partly invested in the acquisition of dozens of taxis, buses and motorcycles that he distributed to unemployed youths who became members of his group. While these ventures generated daily monetary returns to the group's coffers, they also endeared the teeming population of jobless youths to Yusuf(Bello, 2013).[71]

It is important to point out that prior to 2009, the activities of Boko Haram were yet to be regarded as a major security threat to the country. Therefore, the prevailing perception of the group by many northern indigenes at the time was that of a radical organization with occasional tendencies towards violence. The theory of securitization as advanced by the Copenhagen School (UNCP, 1983)[72] helps to make sense of the counter-terrorism dynamics that followed the Nigerian government's reaction to Boko Haram in 2009. In July that year, over 1,000 people lost their lives in several cities across the northern region as a result of major clashes between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces. This created the conditions under which the then Yar 'Adua government was able to declare the group as a significant security threat to the country. More recently in June 2013, securitization of the group was reinforced by President Jonathan, who authorized the gazetting of an order which officially brought the activities of Boko Haram within the purview of Nigeria's Terrorism Prevention Act (Usman, 2018).[73]
The securitization policy appeared to diminish the appeal that Boko Haram exuded among political circles and altered the perception of some who previously saw the group

[70]Bello, A. "Boko Haram: *The Greatest Security Threat to the Sovereignty of Nigeria*" *Premium Ti*mes (4 June 2013), http://premiumtimesng.com/news/137586-jonathan-officially-declares-boko-haram-a-terrorist-organisation.html. Retrieved 15th may, 2018.
(2013), p. 70.
[71]Ibid.
[72] The foundational understanding of the securitization theory can be found in B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (University of North Carolina Press, 1983). P.89
[73]Usman, T., "Jonathan officially declares Boko Haram a terrorist organization", *Premium Ti*mes (4 June 2013), http://premiumtimesng.com/news/137586-jonathan-officially-declares-boko-haram-a-terrorist-organisation.html. Retrieved 15th may, 2018.

as one with legitimate motives.[74] It further induced a surge in the exchange of allegations between political elites suspected to be affiliated with Boko Haram before 2009. For instance, in 2011, a senator representing one of the senatorial districts in Borno State refuted allegations of association with Boko Haram following the arrest and interrogation of a group member known as Mallam Ali Konduga. (Ali & Ogunwale, 2011).[75] More pointed suspicions have characterized the altercation between another serving legislator from Borno State and a former governor. A recent thrust for this controversy stems from the arrest of Shuaibu Bama, who happens to be a nephew of a serving senator, and who was arrested at the house of a former governor in October 2012 (Isah, 2012).[76] While these issues remain tainted with some obscurity, it should be noted that allegations exchanged between (political) elites which hint at Boko Haram affiliation can also be a shrewd political tool to neutralize opposition within the context of state politics. However, beyond this ambiguity is the fact that since the takeover of Boko Haram's leadership by Abubakar Shekau, accompanied by the escalation of violence since July 2009, the evolution and outlook of the group have grown beyond proportions that both political elites (and leaders) can manage. Even though the government of President Muhammadu Buhari is making effort to overcome the Boko Haram and insurgency across the nation by providing funds to security agencies.

4. Result and Discussion

4.1 Conflict Resolution and Peace-Making Process

Conflict is defined as a serious or protracted disagreement between individuals or groups. The source of conflict is usually an unmet needof one or more of the parties involved in the disagreement. Conflict resolution refers to strategies that eliminate the sources of the conflictand, optimally, that find the best outcome for all involved. However, not all conflict resolution processes seek a win-win solution, other terms used somewhat interchangeably with conflict resolution include "dispute resolution," "alternative dispute resolution," and "external dispute resolution."

Dispute resolutionoften refers to the processes of ending conflict through a judicial process, i.e. one party filing a lawsuit against another. Litigation as a form of conflict resolution usually means that an impartial judge and jury will evaluate your case and determine the outcome. Unlike some conflict resolution methods, settling disputes through the court system does not always result in win-win situations. A lawsuit is often settled in favor of one side or the other. Disagreements typically worsen when people identify a solution to the conflict that works for them but which doesn't take into consideration the needs of the opposing group. Often in conflict situations, opposing sides stick to their own solution—or position—because they do not fully understand the needs of the other group, because they do not trust the other group, or out of pride.

The Nigerian government places utmost importance on guaranteeing life, personal liberty and freedom of movement to all Nigerians to enable them participate in development so

[74] During the major Boko Haram uprising in July 2009, several Christians and Muslims in the north either lost their lives or suffered great loss of property

[75] Alli, Y., and Ogunwale, G. "Boko Haram Sponsors: SSS Detains Senator", *The Nation* (22 November 2011), http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/27140-boko-haram-sponsors-sss-detains-senator.html. Retrieved 15th may 2018.

[76] Isah, A., "Ex-Governor Modu Sheriff Is after My Seat, Senator Zannah", *Leadership* (29 October 2012), http://leadership.ng/nga/articles/38610/2012/10/29/exgov_modu_sheriff_after_my_seat_sen_zannah.html?quicktabs_1=2&quicktabs_2=0. Retrieved 15th may, 2018.

as to improve their welfare and that of the nation as a whole (Nigerian Constitution, 1999).[77] It is in this spirit that numerous initiatives have been undertaken geared towards ending armed conflict and attaining peace in the entire nation as well as other parts of the country that are equally affected. This is being achieved through a combination of methods including military operations and campaigns, peace talks with rebel groups, community mobilization, political education, disarmament and amnesty.

4.2 Amnesty as a Process is another way for Conflict Resolution in Kaduna State

Following persistent calls by the most affected communities in the nation and Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) for a peaceful approach to the resolution of armed conflict in the country, the Government in 2016 declared an amnesty in respect of all persons who had been engaged in acts of rebellion.[78] This also followed by some states like Kaduna State, Katsina State and Zamfara State call for the various violent groups to surrender the arms. The amnesty provides assurances and incentives for those wishing to abandon rebellion to do so without fear of retribution or revenge. Some state for example Katsina State followed by Zamfara State in 2016, had granted amnesty to the majority of cattle rustlers (Fulani's) and many of them have surrendered their weapons and were integrated into the community. Implementation is by the Amnesty Committee that also includes the Demobilization and Resettlement Team (DRT) officers operating at state level, working closely with the Police, Director of Public Prosecution, NGOs and donor agencies. Commendable progress has been made in realizing benefits from the Amnesty programme and processes but many challenges also have to be overcome as identified by Amnesty Committee. As a result of this, seventeen members of the Boko Haram surrendered their arms to military personnel and promised not to participate in such act again.[79]

There are also on-going peace negotiations with Boko Haram Rebels, which commenced in March, 2018. Indications are that progress is being made and the religious and political leaders are spearheading these efforts through enlightenment in the worshiping centers. Most prominent among these is the Barrister Aisha's Peace Initiative, which has been bridging the dialogue between Government and the Boko Haram which lead to the release of Dapchi abducted school girls. Government has agreed to a cease-fire on condition that rebels cease kidnapping and attacking civilians and damaging of property. The main challenge is that the rebels are yet to respond to the conditions of the ceasefire. These developments demonstrate a positive trend in Government's efforts to quell the rebellion in the North.[80]

4.3 Disarmament as a Process and ways for Conflict Resolution

The proliferation of arms has aggravated inter-ethnic conflicts and cattle raids within the North East of Nigeria and the neighboring state. Cattle rustling and possession of guns by the Fulani is a key concern to Government and people in the region as this has been identified as a key cause of death and poverty.[81] In December 2016, Government

[77] Section 33, 35 and 41. 1999 Constitution of the FRN.
[78] Statement made by the president to end insurgency in the Northern Nigeria, *Daily Trust News Paper*, 5th February, 2016
[79] FRCN News, 25th may 2018 at 1.00pm.
[80] 2nd March, 2018, Broadcasted by the NTA News at 9.00
[81] After rebels overthrown the government of Moamar Gaddafi of Libya, stores where arms are kept were braked by the rebels and this lead to the proliferation of arms across the east African states. Emphasis mine.

embarked on implementing a disarmament programme aimed at restoring peace across the Northern state after a period of intensive raids that had become increasingly destructive in the late 1999s and early 2009s. The key intentions of the programme included enlisting support for peaceful disarmament of people at grassroots level, ending armed conflict by the Niger Delta militia and the Fulani herdsmen/Boko Haram militia in protecting the citizenry, stopping illegal gun trafficking and working closely with other neighboring countries. These is achieved when the President embarked on strengthening a diplomatic relationship with neighbouring countries to Nigeria. Those who surrendered their guns would be resettled and rehabilitated.

The disarmament process was undertaken in two phases. Phase one conducted during December 2001 entailed the voluntary surrender of weapons by the militia, and phase two implemented immediately thereafter involved forced disarmament by the Nigerian military forces. Phase one registered the highest level of compliance with a total of over 2000 guns being surrendered voluntarily following a sensitization campaign which helped to alley some of the militias' fears about the entire exercise. The collections in phase one represented close to 70 percent of the total number of guns collected in the two phases by 20th September 2002 implying that voluntary surrender is a more effective approach to ridding the area of illegal guns.[82] Greater effort therefore should be focused on helping those in possession of guns to appreciate the need to surrender their guns. Although a lot of efforts have gone into the disarmament process, it has been influenced by different interpretations of its intentions especially by community members. The study reports that in some cases the community members saw the process of disarmament as one that created conditions of vulnerability especially for those who had to surrender their guns before the neighboring communities surrendered their guns.[83] It is therefore necessary that these fears are allayed if the process is going to be effective. The Cattle rustlers bitterly complained about the indiscriminate impounding of their animals, to which some of the state governors issued a directive for it to be stopped. Other studies have called for the establishment of a long-term disarmament exercise with the active control of local leaders in the process.[84]

4.4 Civil Society Involvement in Peace Making Process help in Conflict Resolution

In addition to what has already been mentioned above, many other initiatives have been undertaken by government in collaboration with various NGOs to contribute to reconciliation and the peace-making process. For example, in Katsina state, the government of Katsina state through the office and under the chairmanship of the secretary to the government, and a committee established by federal government on Niger Delta militia, initiate for sustainable peace has been working with various NGOs in the states to promote reconciliation. The project implementation Unit of the committee focuses on reconciliation and efforts to address the problems of water, livestock services, grazing reserves Areas, health centers and schools to educate their children, etc. The Initiative has involved state elders to promote peace based on the family structure. The

[82]FRCN News 8th November, 2002

[83] Muhereza, F.,(2001), :*Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD Sub Region: Phase 2: Implementation* written by Conflict, Disaster and Development Group, University of Leeds, Leeds, P. 31

[84]Muhereza, F.,(2001), :*Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD Sub Region: Phase 2: Implementation* written by Conflict, Disaster and Development Group, University of Leeds, Leeds, P. 31

civilian task forces in collaboration with the other vulnerable cattle rustlers in the last few years has enabled the committee to reach agreements with their neighbours to deal with criminals who cause insecurity in the state. Other states like Kaduna state do not employ the method adopted by Katsina state in providing a sustainable peace in their state. They rather engage task forces by the military and police to fight the Cattle rustlers around the Area of Birnin Gwari and some areas in the Southern Kaduna where the activity of these crimes is persistent. This effort by the Kaduna state cannot provide solution because the Actors are unknown and the cattle rustlers are not ready to surrender their arms.[85]

4.5 Peace Enforcement/Military can be adopted in Conflict Resolution

In addition to the diplomatic measures, Government has also engaged in military campaigns and operations to deter and subdue the rebel forces in the North East and in the Western part of the country. Excessive military pressure exerted on the main rebel group in North East of Nigeria, the Kaduna state and Zamfara state has signed a memorandum of understanding a result of agreement reached by the two states to overcome crimes and killings of innocent persons, kidnapping and any other related crimes that is affecting the peace and commercial businesses in those states. This agreement allowed the states to mount unlimited operations into southern Kaduna and the neighboring borders with Zamfara, Katsina and some borders share with Niger state to destroy the camps of the hiding criminal's bases and rescue the children that are being held captive. This was done through the anti-Boko Haram and cattle rustlers' campaign known as *'OperationZaki, Crocodile, LafiaDole and many others'* that commenced in 2016 (FRCN Program 2017).[86]

This initiative is regarded as being largely successful as it rid civilian areas of rebel infestations. It dislodged the rebel leaders and theirs forces from North East, Southern Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara state which led to the capture of a large number of guns and ammunition. Military and police forces were able to rescue more than 2,000 people and cattle's and livestock who were reportedly being held in the camps. However, a negative consequence of the operation was that having lost refuge in Birnin Gwari forest (the hide out of the criminals), the rebels crossed back into Zamfara, Niger state and southern part of Kaduna state causing terror and great suffering of the people of those areas. Between June and September 2017, more lives and property were lost than in the whole of 2014.[87]

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Contrary to official discourse, Nigeria is no more an 'island of peace and stability' in a conflict ridden/war torn Central African sub-region. Peace and security must not be equated with the absence of internal and external armed war or conflict. The current socio-cultural and political cleavages and latent and/or overt conflict situations indicate that the Nigerian polity is highly volatile and inflammable. The probability of conflicts escalating to large-scale armed struggle is high. The camp forming that exists in the country presently, fuelled by politicians, religious and traditional leaders for selfish reasons is a premonition for pending full-blown conflicts and wars. There is therefore an

[85]Press statement by the SA to the Governor of Kaduna State (Samuel Aruwan) on 18th March, 2018.
[86]FRCN Programme, ''Dimokradiyya adon Kasa'' 8th October 2017 at 8.00 pm

urgent need for a review of the current policy on national security to ensure its effective/successful implementation

The continued loss of lives and property in the past decade and the marked rise in the number of victims in the recent past is of great concern to the Government and presents a major challenge for future growth and development of this region even though in its effort, government provides funds to security agencies to buy Arms in fighting the insurgency. In recognition of this, the Government is rallying all resources at its disposal to bring this rebellion and crimes to an end. To ensure that correct measures are implemented speedily to end the crimes with minimum casualties, the government should promote the socio-economic, religious and socio-political factor in enhancing the security and peace by adopting a peaceful negotiation rather than use of force. Many countries achieve and attain peace through negotiation process, granting amnesty and more importantly involving the civil society organization before the military enforcement.

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